

kipple 61

JUNE 30, 1964

"In the United States there has been much criticism of Indian foreign policy. India has been dubbed a 'stooge of Moscow' and an 'international fellow-traveler'. Americans, however, should understand the extreme urgency for India of concentrating on her internal problems just as their forefathers did up to less than a century ago. Westerners might also realize that, putting themselves in India's shoes, it is easier to point out the defects of one's friends than those of one's potential enemies. During and after the visit of the Russian leaders in late 1955, Nehru made it abundantly clear that India had not joined the Russian camp, that friendship with one nation is not aimed against another. Americans should understand better than they apparently do that a critical contest for leadership is now being carried on in Asia. It is between two ways, two ideals, two approaches to life. On the one hand, there is India believing in the parliamentary way, the Bill of Rights, and the importance of the individual. On the other, there is Communist China dedicated to force, disdain of the individual, and the collective way. Both are striving to solve their economic difficulties, and their degree of success or failure will be watched closely by other Asian peoples. If India falters it will result in the dominance of China throughout Asia, with dire consequences to the rest of the world."

--T. Walter Wallbank

The journal of rash opinion and commentary is edited and published by Ted Pauls, 1448 Meridene Dr., Baltimore, Md., 21212. Copies are usually available in exchange for letters of comment, other periodicals, contributions (articles, verse, etc.), or the cash sum of 20¢ per issue. The number in the address box of the mailing wrapper is the number of the last issue you will receive; the letter "T" indicates that we exchange publications; the letter "S" means this is a sample copy. This magazine is dedicated to the proposition that what this country need is a good five-cent nickle, and supports Hyato Rabino-witz as a candidate for the Presidency.

-WOKLpress-

PUBLICOLA: ESSAYS

11

The observation that a condition of "Law and Order" must necessarily be numbered among the characteristic attributes of any well-governed community may at first glance appear to embrace a fact too obvious, or to use a suspect term, too "self-evident", to be deserving of further reflection. When one contemplates, however, how self-evident the flatness of the earth is to the limited perception of the naked human eye, the myopic implications of the assumption of self-evidence become strikingly obvious. In a manner not dissimilar to the contemporaries of Columbus, one of the peculiar afflictions of our day appears to be a myopia of the Reason insofar as the philosophical connotations of the term "Law and Order" are concerned; this at a time when both a degenerate barbarism and the possibility of complete annihilation lie at the world's doorstep. In an age marked by the atrocities of Vorkuta and Auschwitz, Buchenwald and Budapest, such myopia of the intellect is a luxury which mankind can ill afford. To shrug off the responsibility of reflecting upon the essence of "Law and Order", to passively accept such a condition as "good" when compared with Brand "X", or to permit oneself the intellectual palliative of viewing "Law and Order" as some sort of natural phenomenon not unlike the primordial forest, is to indulge oneself in the vice of an intellectual laziness of the first order. This, as the experience of our century has abundantly illustrated, is a certainty which springs from the fact that a state of "Law and Order" is not "natural" in the normal sense of that term. Such being the case, it is clear that "Law and Order" is a condition which must be wrung from nature, and consciously cultivated if it is to flourish. But if we are to cultivate, we must first comprehend. Failing this, the course which remains is to discover some simple manner of conveniently becoming an idiot. A modest contribution therefore to the prevention of idiocy will be the objective of this essay.

At the outset it seems pertinent to suggest that a refusal on the part of many thinkers to contemplate the means of realizing and sustaining a condition of "Law and Order" must, in either a direct or indirect way, be the result of either one of two presumptions. The first of these is what might be called the "Court Fool" theory. This theory is held in particular by those of totalitarian inclinations, and seeks to explain the phenomenon of "Law and Order" by viewing such a condition as the mechanical product of the decrees of authority--it matters little to the theory whether these decrees be the written judgement of legislators or the arbitrary commands of a Byzantine despot--by means of a simple cause-and-effect relationship. The kernel of "Law and Order", from this standpoint, is to be sought in passive obedience, rather than normative or reasoned acceptance of the imperatives of society. On this view, it must be said that the Order which prevailed in the camps of Hitler's Germany, or which yet prevails behind the Wall of the German Democratic Republic, is to be looked upon in exactly the same manner as that which is to be found beyond the barbed wire fences. In other words, Order is reduced to a principle of discipline, compliance with which is evoked merely by fear of ultimate--if not immediate--reprisal, while "Law" is similarly resolved into the obverse, a principle of compulsion. These, then, are the logical conclusions of the tautological theory of "Law and Order".

Following in the manner of a corollary from the above is the view which starts from the premise that "Law and Order" is a concept and

CONSERVATISM

NUMBER THREE

a social condition with which all men must needs be at least distantly familiar, by virtue of the simple fact that they are inhabitants of a civilized society. It is with this particular modification of the "Court Fool" theory in mind, including the discipline and compulsion principles of the tautological point of view, that the majority of those who speculate on matters political are presently drifting to the point where confusion sets in between Order and discipline.

This is the particular intellectual muddle which in our view lies at the heart of the dilemma of modern liberalism, particularly in its most vulgar and authoritarian forms. It is questionable however whether much variation from this stream of thought can seriously be expected from today's liberals, being as they are, the doubting wanderers between the extremes of authoritarian Marxism, on the one hand, and Deweyite progressiveism of the "Brave New World" variety, on the other. The hybrid progeny of this particular mating appears to find its center of gravity in the noxious proposition that whatever the Welfare State "orders" is to be taken as "Order", per se. What this implies, of course, is not only the complete negation of "Order", taken in the sense of prescriptive stability and historical continuity, but also a revolutionary break with the traditions of Western thought beginning with the Magna Charta forced upon King John. No one can seriously question the claim that the social Planner and the social Engineer of the currently envisioned liberal millenium would have a greater opportunity and likelihood of becoming despotic than the medieval king could ever have seriously entertained, even in his most delirious moments. The feudal nobility was a class that entertained its own opinion of what constituted "Order". How effective such a rival center of power has been in the emergence of ordered liberty is witnessed by Western political developments after 1215. How effective the mass man of our own day is proving to be in defending this tradition is illustrated by the increasing province of governmental authority during the recent few decades. The point might be summarized by reference to Burke's famous dictum, that the less order there is within the individual citizen, the more will be exercised by the state. In a time when the "other-directed" of David Riesman's "Lonely Crowd" appear to have emerged as the dominant social type, it cannot be otherwise than that government should become the strict disciplinarian, watching over the children in their erotic play. Moreover, when all things are given to Caesar, all things are expected from Caesar. On this score there is really very little difference of historical fact between the "bread and circuses" provided the Roman mob, as described by Juvenal, and the welfare provided to such grotesque extremes of absurdity by short-sighted liberal do-gooders, who mistakenly assume that material good is the highest good and that "circuses" can be indicative of anything other than fundamental social sickness.

In opposition to the Planner mentality, which views Order in the same manner as externally imposed discipline on a herd of human cattle, one of the strengths of the conservative philosophy, which harkens from as far back as the "Politics" of Aristotle, is its refusal to look upon "Law and Order" as matters of mere decree. As the philosopher observed, and as Edmund Burke wrote in much the same manner, Order must rise above the level of Law, to the point where it takes on what might be called a spiritual nature, and as such becomes an explicit aspect of the human personality, and of individual behavior. The inevitable prerequisite of

normative behavior, however, must almost by definition be said to repose in historical continuity and social prescription. For if the actions of men are to be in harmony with the ultimate objectives and the fundamental ethical consensus which lies at the foundation of any community, it is obvious that both of these criteria by which behavior is to be judged must be relatively enduring and free from the sophistry of presumptuous arrogance.

In the absence, however, of a widespread sense of Historic consciousness and historical continuity, normative behavior must necessarily be replaced to an ever-increasing extent by arbitrary decree; such a course of development follows almost inevitably in the wake of a society which idolizes the Cult of Innovation ("circuses"), despises its past or at best looks upon it as irrelevant (looking upon its own age as one of plentitude), and consequently betrays true social Order to a Heraclitian world of flux insofar as ethics and the socially acceptable patterns of behavior are concerned. In a world where nothing is permanent, and where all that is must necessarily be subverted by what historical determinism prophesies must come, only those who are responsible for the manipulation and realization of "what must become" can plausibly be given responsibility for the ordering of society. By subtracting social prescription, we arrive by means of a simple process of arithmetic at the Court Fool theory once again.

But we are now at least on the way to some very positive conclusions. It will be observed that the belief is present in all we have said that there can be discerned an important question of freedom between the poles of traditionalism and artificial Order. The implication has been urged repeatedly that Order which takes the form an elite shepherding a herd cannot but be tantamount to the negation of civil liberty. This particular claim can be seen from an analysis of either the Planner at the top or, alternatively, the forgotten individual at the bottom, and the depths of degeneration to which he must sink before willingly subjecting his life to such a blatant exertion of Pleonexia.

At the same time, however, we have additionally implied that those restrictions upon freedom of action and thought which have withstood the test of time and the trials of the past requirements of the community are not really restrictions of liberty at all. This brings us to the point where we must inquire of ourself whether there lies within what we have suggested an inherent contradiction; that is, to be specific, can we admit the apparent conclusion that there can and must be restrictions upon human freedom, precisely in order that this freedom can be permitted to exist? What we have uncovered here is a more or less Lockean problem of the limits which should be advisedly imposed on both the citizen and his government. And in this regard, to continue the use of Lockean terminology, the alternatives which present themselves immediately are the extremes of rootless anarchy in the supposed "state of nature", and that of limited government (the obverse of which must be limited freedom). Without allowing oneself the luxury of agreement with Locke, it can nevertheless be suggested that by means of transposing his reflections into our own day there is something to be gained. And this is to be found precisely in the conflict between that species of anarchic liberalism and ethical nihilism which at the turn of this century permitted itself to be seduced by the Marxist vision of the "withering" state, and a condition of what we would choose to call "ordered liberty" as the only alternative. Viewing the events of the twentieth century in retrospect, the benefit of hindsight permits one to reach once again the conclusion of Burke when he prophesied the emergence of governmental Caesarism in post-revolutionary France; namely, the less order within, the more must be without. That is, the more vitriolic the attacks upon tradition, habit and prejudice become, the graver the dan-

ger that freedom itself will be lost in the pursuit of freedom. Perhaps no clearer example can be suggested of the perennial weakness of "intellectual" liberalism as the case where reason has clearly risen up against and overthrown itself--witness Eastern Europe in this regard, and recall the delirium with which Western liberals blissfully fell over themselves in the early part of the century in order to ascertain who could sing loudest the praise of the Soviet experiment.

It is possible that the conflict which we herein have in mind can be more easily elucidated by reflecting for a moment upon the province of freedom in one's individual life, as abstracted from society. In this connection, we would do well to recognize at the first the Cyclopean influence of "habit" in each and every action we perform in the course of any single day. Practically every event from the simplest to the most complex is predicated upon the strength of habit. And this is undoubtedly the case for the simple reason that it has been discovered by each of us, independently, that habit can be relied upon to perform with much greater ease and efficacy than the conscious application of the Reason the vast majority of those routine actions which confront us daily. Can it be seriously contended, however, that because there is only a very limited exertion of the conscious Reason in the act of tying our shoes, we are therefore to be considered less free than would otherwise be the case? Or to put the matter more clearly, is it not obvious that the infringement of freedom would come not in the voluntary performance of an act which has become habitual, but precisely at the point where the application of external force requires of us that we alter this given pattern of action? In this particular example it is strikingly clear that freedom must be said to lie, beyond doubt, in the province of habit.

But as with the individual, so also with society, for what is "habit" when transposed into a social context other than social prescription? To put the question in reverse, what are the inherited customs, institutions, and values of society if not social habits? It is through the acceptance of these particular social habits that social Order becomes realized, thereby permitting to each individual the prescriptive liberty accruing to his position in society. Prescription might be said to constitute a social fence, as it were, within which liberty which harmonizes with social Order becomes possible. When once the fence is destroyed, however, and anarchy becomes manifest in the form of revolutionary change, the innate social inclinations of men must invariably re-assert themselves--only now the fence must be higher, wider, and more impregnable than the claims of Order in the form of prescriptive and normative behavior were once capable of. The temptation to point to the Berlin Wall or the ideological "Iron Curtain" of the Soviet Union proves irresistible in this context.

But if social Order of the prescriptive type constitutes the invariable alternative to the principles of discipline and compulsion which emerge from the tautological Court Fool theory, what place can there be said to be for "Law", as the positive assertion of authority? The conclusion, it appears, is obvious, that Law must not only reflect the imperatives of prescription, but the institutionalized aspect of the Law must consciously seek itself to behave in a prescriptive manner, if any sort of social Order other than that enforced by bayonets is to emanate from the community setting. The latter notion is of course none other than the belief that if a state of Eunomia in the Greek meaning is to be realized, insofar as such is possible, it is desirable that the Rule of Law take precedence over the Rule of Men. The arbitrary decree motivated by a smug and pernicious presumption on the part of an elitist group of any description is but a weak palliative for a social milieu once characterized by the Rule of Law. Equally malignant and

baneful is the notion that the Bar of Justice can, without prejudicing its assumed objectives, become an innovatory and creative body. The judicial institutions of society, even more than the legislative, are never to be conceived as proud and presumptuous creators of anything other than just decisions which accord with prescriptive stability. No certainty emanates more strikingly from the annals of history than the conclusion that the instrumentalities of the "Law" are not creators in an original sense, but trustees, answerable for their trust to both posterity and, ultimately, in the view of conservatives, to the One Creator and the Author of society itself.

From yet a second standpoint, the immanent desirability of prescription on the part of the "Law" can be elucidated through recognition of the often-blurred fact that the essence of any law is to be discerned as resting in a legal enunciation of the rights of the citizens in general, or if the law be particular in nature, of particular citizens. It is clear, however, that the obverse of any right is a duty. Bearing this in mind, it can be shown with relative ease that if there is to be any semblance of true and self-imposed Order in society, the mutual interpossession of rights and obligations among the individuals therein must be commonly known to all; if the case be otherwise, illegitimate claims will inevitably be made by one citizen upon another, thereby resulting in either successful deception or righteous refusal, either of which must in the long run comprise the seeds of conflict and a break-down of social Order. We arrive therefore once again at the inference that Law must be prescriptive, for how otherwise can rights and duties be known to all--or, for that matter, to anyone?

If we are to consciously cultivate and sustain a condition of "Law and Order", therefore, taking into account the delicate fabric of which ordered stability is comprised, such an endeavor must first be established upon a categorical rejection of any and all assertions that arbitrary decree can be the fountainhead of true social Order. In other words, we must accept the Court Fool theory for what it is; namely, a criminal deception exalted by Fools, in order that Foolishness might become the touchstone of society, and that the Fools themselves may be permitted in their glorious audacity to rule therein.

In the absence of the Rule of Law, the innermost meaning of which is to be found in constant appeal to judicial precedent, society must practically without exception experience a crisis of tradition which results in the extirpation of social Order. At this point there can be but two alternatives: either men must revert to the standing of lost souls in a setting which they can neither comprehend nor accommodate themselves to, or else discover some means of recovering the angelic perfection of the rude savage envisioned by Rousseau or Freud. The course of history would indicate, however, to all who will but consult its oracles, that the latter option is but a fantastic chimera, the last refuge of deluded minds which have found themselves incapable of bearing the agony of reality (or perhaps of the social ennui of our own day). Moreover, as we have attempted to make clear, the first alternative, which is but the precursor of sophistic nihilism and social disintegration, can only culminate in the re-assertion of authority in the form of Caesarism and an Order which is based upon the naked will to power and the raw resort to coercion as the only plausible means thereto. The French Revolutionaries demanded "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity". What they ended up with was the Liberty of every degenerate to pillage the treasures of History, the Equality of Robespierre and Napoleon, and the Fraternity of Madame La Guillotine.

--Publicola

To most Americans, judging by letters to the newspapers and sidewalk polls, "Communism" seems to mean a kind of loathsome beast preparing to overrun and subjugate the world. The monster always lives in Moscow, though Peiping houses a related jackal. Tito's third species of "Communism", living in Yugoslavia, is seldom mentioned.

The popular picture of this ugly brute is strongly reminiscent of the pre-war image of "Fascism", which to most Americans was also a loathsome monster bent on world domination. I remember maps in the press showing Hitler's anticipated routes of conquest reaching into the Western Hemisphere like so many tentacles. Here, under the big arrow, the armored divisions would take off from Casablanca to the bulge of Brazil (dotted line), and thence up to Texas--with a fine disregard for the Amazon, the Orinoco, and the jungles of Panama. Similar arrows in the newspapers today show the possible path of "Communism" down through Southwest Asia.

To exorcise the Communist monster, both military and political weapons are advocated. They range from more guns to Laos and the landing of marines in Cuba, to the witch hunts of the John Birch Society, and even include the demand for the impeachment of the Chief Justice as a Communist agent.

Erich Fromm, who is devoting his talents to a study of international affairs from the viewpoint of a psychiatrist, fears that many of us suffer from paranoid thinking. In a recent book, "May Man Prevail?", Fromm wrote:

"Most Americans today think about Russia in a paranoid fashion; namely, they ask what is possible rather than what is probable. It is possible that Khrushchev wants to conquer us by force. It is possible that he makes peace proposals in order to make us unaware of the danger. (...) If we think only of possibilities, then indeed there is no chance for realistic political action.

"Sane thinking means not only to think of possibilities, which in fact are always relatively easy to recognize, but to think also of probabilities. That means to examine the realistic situations, and to predict to some extent an opponent's probable action by means of an analysis of all the factors and motivations that influence his behavior."

On a probability basis there is good reason to believe that the West is confronted not with a tentacled monster, but with two dynamic nations, Russia and China. They use Marxian slogans and call themselves "Communist"; but most careful analysts agree that they are not following the course charted by Marx and Lenin. Russia in particular is off course. Her leaders, for instance, no longer envisage war with "capitalism" as inevitable, as did Marx. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev has repeatedly said that Marx did not anticipate a nuclear war, and war in the nuclear age, he says, is more likely to result in mutual suicide than in victory.

There is good reason to believe on a probability basis that the threat from Moscow is not so much that of an ideological monster as that of a high-powered nationalism on the march; not so much Karl Marx as Peter the Great. Such a view removes the mysticism and translates the threat to something more realistic and familiar: the drive of empire, well-known and well-documented from Alexander the Great to Kaiser Wilhelm II.

We thus have, in semantic terms, the Marxian model of Communism,

wherein the workers of the world, the "prisoners of starvation", arise, strike off their chains and overthrow the "capitalists"; and a quite different Communism, whereby two dynamic nations press for new spheres of influence, using Marxian slogans as an aid. This article is geared to the latter Communism, as more probable and so more realistic than the traditional portrait of Communism. Most of the time I shall label it "Russia-or-China" in the interest of clarity, letting the label "Communism" stand for the old Marxian ideology.

If pressed, Khrushchev might admit another unprecedented effect of the nuclear age: his enormous land armies no longer dare overrun Europe, as they might have done in 1946. This is not because of NATO, but because Russian cities behind his armies would probably be incinerated by a shower of hydrogen bombs within hours after he started to move. He can destroy the West with his own hydrogen bombs, but he cannot conquer it militarily.

Meanwhile the growth of affluence in the West has immunized most of its workers against the Marxian dialectic. There will be no uprisings of the proletariat so long as the West remains reasonably prosperous. This high probability has been inadequately appreciated. Agents of the Russian and Chinese empires can make strong appeals to the peoples of other nations whose allegiance and resources they covet. But these appeals are potent only in the so-called Hungry World. They fall on deaf ears in highly developed societies. What was true a hundred years ago when Marx wrote the "Communist Manifesto"--a savagely exploited industrial proletariat in the mines and mills of Western Europe--is no longer true.

The advent of the welfare state and the industrial evolution to a mixed economy have robbed Marxism of its attraction. Political groups dedicated to violent revolution, or even to the supremacy of manual workers via the ballot, are in retreat in the United States, Canada, Britain, Germany, Western Europe, Australia, and Japan. Manual workers in these areas care less for the class struggle than for vacation time and color television.

Russia and China, furthermore, are not attempting to foment revolutions in any of these areas. Stalin, indeed, had a fixed policy against doing so. The ring of "Communist" satellites around Russia from Poland to Bulgaria were not products of revolution, but captives of the Russian armies set up as barriers against another Hitler. Communist parties in the West have not been encouraged to revolt, but to act as agents for Russian foreign policy, including the use of espionage.

The reason is clear. "Communism" in any form is politically dead in the West, because workers are relatively so prosperous under the democratic system. On a recent trip to Russia, I returned via Vienna and London. Observing the goods in the shop windows, the clothing of the people on the streets, particularly their shoes, observing slums and housing developments, the traffic stream, parks and playgrounds, I would roughly rate Vienna fifty percent, and London one hundred percent higher in living standards than Moscow. New York, of course, is higher still. The manual worker's average annual wage is about \$1,200 in Russia, but four times that in the United States. Russia may "catch up" in a decade or two, but it is doubtful if China ever can; there are not enough raw materials available on the planet.

However, the underdeveloped societies of the Hungry World--those in Asia, Africa, and Latin America with family incomes below \$100 a year, and a literacy rate of less than fifty percent--are wide open to the appeals of Russian and Chinese agents. According to Paul G. Hoffman, Director of the United Nations Special Fund, 1.3 billion people in the underdeveloped countries--not including the Chinese--are at economic rock bottom. Furthermore, they are aware of it, Hoffman says. "There is

hardly a village anywhere that does not have its radio," he points out, "and hardly a villager who is not now convinced that a better life is possible for him and his children."

The first great appeal of Russia and China is the promise of that better life. The poor peasant hears on the village radio about the food, housing, and luxuries enjoyed by the workers of industrialized societies. When agents from Russia or China say that they will help his country industrialize and get these commodities too, he listens eagerly, even if the dialectics escape him. The agents at his door are riding the wave of the Twentieth Century technological revolution.

The second great appeal of Russian and Chinese salesmen is to local pride and patriotism. Your country, they say, will be rescued from colonialism and imperialism. It will have a flag, a national anthem, a 21-gun salute, and a seat at the United Nations. You are as good as anyone, whatever your color, or education, or previous condition of servitude. The urge to be free and independent is massive throughout the Hungry World, as the growing membership in the United Nations bears witness.

The third great appeal is psychological; it is the appeal to hatred. The restless villager is urged to hate the rich, the landlords, the usurers, the war lords, and the potentates, who have taken half or more of his crop since time out of mind. The rich are easy to hate. The shell of culture, which has held in check these timeless resentments and hatreds, is now cracking open. It would be cracking open even if there were no agents from Russia or China. The poor peasant, prompted by the village radio, has had enough.

The agents of Russia and China can go far by manipulating these powerful appeals for a better life, a proud state, and hatred of overlords, domestic and foreign. Agents in Cuba are using all three very effectively at the present moment. Cuba will also provide, I suspect, an illuminating case history of the weaknesses of this approach, for reasons which I shall now try to make clear.

Attempts by Russia-or-China to dominate the peoples of the Hungry World collide with four stubborn economic barriers, one stubborn political barrier, and, perhaps most serious of all, the high improbability that two dynamic national empires, far apart in tradition and culture, can amicably cooperate to conquer the world. The question is bound to come, and some of us think it has already come in Moscow and Peiping: "Who's in charge around here?"

First, the economic barriers:

(1) Neither the Russians nor the Chinese have reckoned adequately with the population explosion. I attended a conference with Russian intellectual leaders in the Crimea last year where the idea that population would soon outrun food supply on the Malthusian formula was branded by the Russians as "completely incorrect". All available statistical evidence, however, points to a gap which is fast widening. Only in Japan has the birth rate been held in check.

This raises a most interesting question. Assuming that Russia and China make considerable headway with their appeals as set forth above, how long can they supply the bread lines of their dependents--especially as both are having considerable trouble in their own bread departments? China is said to be in the midst of a major famine, and is buying wheat from Canada, while Khrushchev is obliged to rush frequently to the "virgin lands" in Siberia to find out what has gone wrong. Food surpluses on the U.S. model are unthinkable for many years in China and Russia. Meanwhile, their proposed wards and allies in the Hungry World will grow hungrier year by year, unless the birth rate is reduced to less than thirty per thousand--a project to which neither empire has given adequate thought. Eugene R. Black of the International Bank of De-

velopment affirms that even large sacrifices by highly developed societies for greatly increased foreign aid will be unavailing "in the face of existing rates of population growth".

Russia and China are bound to collide with this barrier in the near future. It is axiomatic, I think, that their wards cannot be held firmly in line unless they are fed. Starving dependents do not make good sales talk.

(2) When Russia-or-China have helped to engineer a local revolution they must then help organize a socialist economy, in which the government owns and operates the principal means of production. This is axiomatic too, but promises to be at best an uncertain business in the world of today. Perhaps the nation can coast along for a while by dividing up the lands and other assets of the expropriated rich, as Cuba is trying to do. But the only permanent solution--assuming the birth rate is held low enough--lies in scientific agriculture and industrialization, including ample supplies of inanimate energy. To provide the technical specialists, the supplies, and equipment for this socialist society is likely to make quite a hole in the resources of Russia and China--a good deal more, one suspects, than any raw materials which might be received as an offset. This service must go on for years, with every new socialist state increasing the drain. I would very much like to see the account in Moscow's ledger marked "Cuba, 1961".

It has taken Russia forty years to build her own industrial plant to a point where it is in competition with the West, while China has barely begun. Consider the cost in manpower and materials of equipping Africa, Asia, and Latin America with a modern industrial and agricultural establishment. Consider the colossal training programs. Most citizens of the Hungry World now possess neither mechanical nor administrative skills. Most of them--as in the Congo--cannot read a primer, let alone a blueprint.

(3) The promises of socialism often backfire. Its promoters and propagandists always promise in advance, and most explicitly, that wages will be higher, housing better, working hours shorter, together with a complex program of medical care, education, and social security. "Relax, comrades, Utopia will be won!"

When I was investigating "Operation Bootstrap" in Puerto Rico, I found there had been a similar reaction at the beginning of the experiment in the late 1940's. Workers in the five new state factories believed that socialism had arrived, and took it easy. They were now the favored class, according to theory, and they expected favored treatment--high wages, short hours, fringe benefits of all kinds. But the factories soon lost so much money that they had to be sold to private owners, and the goal of socialism shifted to the mixed economy prevalent throughout the West, wherein the state undertakes only those essential functions which private enterprise will not, or cannot perform.

Russia and China, on the calculus of probability, will not be happy with the profit and loss accounts of most local enterprises financed by them in Africa, Asia, and Latin America--at least not under the kind of welfare system explicitly promised, and the one to which the peoples of the Hungry World aspire. So Russia-or-China will have to meet the operating deficits or lose an ally.

(4) The alternative to the above program of loans and advances for capital formation is the program Russia herself has followed: take the needed capital out of the annual production of the workers. By enforcing rigorous discipline, with long hours, low wages, neglected housing, no luxuries, and dreadful penalties for strikes and stoppages, enough has been produced to build an impressive industrial establishment, while keeping consumers alive, if not contented. I visited Russia in the late 1920's and observed the formula beginning to operate after the

collapse of "war Communism".

It is safe to say that no open society would tolerate such a method of capital formation today--though some did in the Nineteenth Century. It is extremely doubtful if any society in the Hungry World will tolerate it--especially after hearing all the Utopian promises. If Russia and China use this method of forced savings in an emerging nation, they will have to abandon all Utopian promises, and reduce the country to virtual slavery. This will not make particularly good propaganda for a Communist program of world conquest. Also there may be a serious raw materials problem.

There are only two ways to industrialize--borrow or wangle capital from abroad, or save it out of current production at home. Russia used the latter; China is trying to do the same, aided, however, by some loans from Russia.

(5) The fifth barrier to the conquest of the world by Russia-or-China is more political than economic. Castro in Cuba will furnish an interesting test. It should be clearly apparent that there can be no "democracy" in our sense of the term in any country of the Hungry World. Political democracy, with free speech, free press, free investment and consumer choices, is unworkable without a high degree of literacy and a substantial middle class--assets which no nation in the Hungry World now possesses. A military junta (as in South Korea) or a single strong man (as in Egypt) will break through any paper constitution, however eloquent, and take over.

Will the local power faction be amenable to serving as the tool of Russia or China? Will it meekly endure having its decrees written or over-ruled by Moscow or Peiping? The probabilities are strongly against it. Egypt's Nasser gives an illuminating answer. The West thought he had sold out to Russia at one time; Russia thought he was a pawn of the West at another time. Actually, as we now know, Nasser has skillfully played off one side against the other, receiving large handouts from both. He never had the slightest intention of being anybody's pawn. Dictators and military juntas are tough, or they would not be there, and they tend to be fiercely patriotic. Once they surrender power to Moscow or Peiping, the second great appeal collapses, the promise of a proud and independent state. Will a local strong man, just free of the colonialism, say, of Portugal, be willing to enter the colonial empire of China? The question answers itself.

(6) The last and greatest barrier to world conquest is the inevitable competition for leadership between two dynamic empires. Russia and China are even now competing for that strategic land that lies between them, Outer Mongolia. This is only the beginning. Presently they will become involved in fierce altercations over which empire is to assume the obligations of their Hungry World dependents. They are already far apart ideologically, but this cleavage is a tiny crack compared to what may separate them when it comes to the division of large areas of the world.

On the assumption of two dynamic nationalisms, rather than one ideological monster, "Communism" is less threatening. It becomes subject to realistic analysis in space and time rather than an exercise in demonology. A modern Machiavelli, studying the balance sheet, might go so far as to say, let Russia and China assume the liabilities of the Hungry World unimpeded. There is no better way to bankrupt them. But we are not Machiavelli, and we cannot be so cynical. We must help the people of the Hungry World because they need help, not just use them as pawns in the cold war. All formulas for help, however, should take account of the difficulties listed in the balance sheet, especially the burgeoning populations.

In summary, Russia and China now have no reliable class base with

which to subvert and convert the gainfully employed in the affluent societies of the West. It is safe to say that they never will have such a base so long as the West is reasonably prosperous. They can make, and are making, three powerful appeals to the Hungry World: higher living standards for poor peasants, national independence, and encouragement of the class hatreds already endemic. To make these appeals good, however, Russia-or-China must be prepared to feed, organize, and equip the Hungry World at a cost in capital formation far beyond available resources, with population outrunning subsistence in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Furthermore, Russia and China are almost certain to have serious difficulty in converting local strong men into subservient stooges. Finally, the Communist nations are extremely liable to get into lethal disagreements about the responsibility of each in underwriting the operational deficits of three continents.

In short, on the basis of any realistic analysis, the case for "Communism" conquering the world is highly improbable.

--Stuart Chase

/"Will Communism Conquer the World" is reprinted from a pamphlet of the same title published by the Sidney Hillman Foundation, Inc./

"No social scientist who has been closely in touch with the uses of social science in World War II, or even studied closely the ways in which propaganda and indoctrination methods were used after World War I, can doubt that awareness and understanding can be used destructively as well as constructively, that social science in itself carries no guarantee of good to mankind, any more than theoretical physics does. Pursued without responsibility, either may lead to evil as easily as to good, though it be the rotting of a social structure rather than the obliteration of a ten-mile area of a modern city." --Margaret Mead, in "Male and Female".

"I could never have brought myself to make this confession of my most secret thoughts and feelings had I not been approached with a disarming humanity and understanding that I had never dared to expect.

"It is because of this humane understanding that I have tried to assist as best I can in throwing some light on matters that seemed obscure.

"But whenever use is made of what I have written, I beg that all those passages relating to my wife and my family, and all my tender emotions and secret doubts, shall not be made public.

"Let the public continue to regard me as the bloodthirsty beast, the cruel sadist, and the mass murderer; for the masses could never imagine the commandant of Auschwitz in any other light.

"They could never understand that he, too, had a heart and that he was not evil." --Rudolph Hoess, in "Commandant of Auschwitz".

"After its long isolation the Russian Church is scarcely able to speak to modern intellectuals on equal terms. The chief strength of the Church is still among the simple-minded. Russian popular religion has surprised the Communists by its vitality, and Russian unbelievers are naturally shocked by the superstition which is so intertwined with spirituality that even a sympathetic observer is hard put to it to disentangle one from another." --John Lawrence, in "A History of Russia".

"Stand with anybody that stands right while he is right and part with him when he goes wrong." --Abraham Lincoln.

PRINCIPLES AND POLICY: In the continuing debate between liberals and conservatives with respect to government policy, foreign and domestic, the most commonly uttered--and, to the naive, most compelling--criticism in the arsenal of conservative rhetoricians is the charge that liberals generally tend to espouse a highly pragmatic and hence essentially "unprincipled" policy. William F. Buckley, perhaps the most imposing intellect in the conservative camp, is particularly fond of this thesis. The most recent repetition of this criticism by an articulate conservative may be found in Kipple #60, where Publicola, in the second of his essays on conservatism, asserted that socialists and liberals are moral relativists, men of shifting principles. That this accusation

JOTTINGS

FROM THE EDITOR'S DESK

is founded upon nothing more substantial than the fundamental inability of most conservatives to understand the philosophy of liberalism is irrelevant, for in many circles the liberal's presumed lack of principles is not only accepted but elevated to the position of a religious tenet. In truth, I know only two liberals who are in fact moral relativists, and their views could hardly be considered representative. And a socialist cannot by definition be a moral relativist, since to advocate socialism it is necessary to embrace a certain category of moral standards and believe that they are inherently superior to the ethical premises and precepts of other political philosophies. What the conservative mistakenly identifies as moral relativism is the tolerance and open-mindedness which, with deplorable but, on the whole, infrequent lapses, characterizes the average liberal; what the conservative interprets as a lack of principles is, in fact, the hostility toward certain specifically conservative principles with which liberalism is traditionally identified.

A mitigating circumstance in the otherwise quite inexplicable failure of most conservatives to comprehend the liberal philosophy as it relates to this matter lies in the divergent concepts of "principle" evolved by the opposing factions. The principles of a liberal, in the final analysis, are few, highly generalized, and very inclusive (e.g., the desirability of justice, the maximization of individual choice, and so forth). But the conservative ehshrines as "principles" a hideous conglomeration of moral precepts, religious tenets, legal dicta, policies, and election slogans; wherever conservatives have long been in control, one finds a remarkable proliferation of principles applicable to every aspect of life. One is reminded of the religious Puritans, who possessed biblical injunctions governing their daily lives so thoroughly that virtually everything was either prohibited or mandatory; similarly, the conservative attempts to enforce with the utmost rigidity his dozens of sacred principles, some good, some bad, most indifferent. Anyone who questions applying the term "principle" to so many specific legal prohibitions, social conventions and traditional policies is likely to be accused of lack-

ing principles altogether.

The most recent clash of this continuing controversy was initiated by Senator J. William Fulbright, in a now-famous speech calling for increased flexibility in United States foreign policy. Charges of "lack of principles" are invariably uttered whenever liberals beseech the government to adopt a more flexible foreign policy, because conservatives immediately interpret such a plea as a call for vacillation and timidity. The conservative reaction to Senator Fulbright's memorable address was typical; the more extreme partisans of the Right accused the Arkansas lawmaker of deliberate un-Americanism, softness on Communism, and other miscellaneous sins, while the more intelligent conservatives propounded a slightly more charitable thesis: viz., that Fulbright was merely a fool, an unwitting dupe of the diabolical Communists.

The principal reason for this over-zealous reaction to what was, by any rational standard, a rather tame (albeit exceptionally intelligent) speech, is that conservatives, to a man, do not adequately appreciate the difference between a principle and a policy. Flexibility of policy can be interpreted as capitulation and appeasement only if it is equated with the compromise of principles. If Senator Fulbright had demanded greater flexibility in our principles, then he would, indeed, have been guilty of counseling weakness. But since the astute Senator observed merely that our policies should be sufficiently flexible that they remain able to cope with a constantly changing world, his was, on the contrary, the voice of strength and determination.

International politics, quite obviously, exists in a state of constant change. An effective foreign policy must therefore be capable of constantly adjusting in order to accommodate new situations, and so flexibility becomes a necessary attribute of the successful foreign policy and of each specific policy of which it is comprised. The alternative is suicidal. If the foreign policy of any nation is too rigid to adapt sufficiently to a new situation, then the response of that nation to the situation will, ipso facto, be inappropriate--and, to that extent, dangerous.

The official United States policy which refuses to recognize any government which comes to power by anti-democratic means is an outstanding example of an inflexible policy, and an examination of its effects ought to be illuminating. There is nothing particularly wrong with this policy, as a topic for abstract debate, but it is terribly unrealistic. There are certain cases, obviously, where a military government installed by a coup d'état represents a definite improvement over the previous regime, however constitutional it may have been. In other cases, the policy is manifestly a self-defeating one: implementing the policy rarely has any desirable effects (our non-recognition of military juntas and subsequent withdrawal of aid has not caused many of them to collapse), and often involves jeopardizing our relations with a heretofore friendly nation. Finally, there are simply areas (most notably South Vietnam) in which our involvement and commitment is so great that we cannot afford to withdraw recognition and support from the de facto government, no matter how many unconstitutional upheavals occur.

No government can long survive in the international arena unless it deals realistically with realistic situations, and many of our specific policies interfere with this process and prevent our foreign policy as a whole from functioning smoothly, or else serve as paper policies, to be ignored when it is expedient to do so. The policy of not recognizing military juntas did not prevent the embarrassingly rapid recognition of the regime which replaced former Brazilian President Joao Goulart, nor did it prevent the recognition of both South Vietnam military rebellions; realistically, it could not be allowed to. But because

the actions of the United States government in those instances directly contradicted official policy, this nation was placed in the uncomfortable position of engaging in organized hypocrisy.

Inflexible policies will have this result--or worse--in every case. The distinguishing characteristic of an inflexible policy is that it will no longer be appropriate if the situation with which it was created to deal changes even slightly. When such an eventuality arises, the nation which formulated the policy is faced with a choice between two equally distasteful alternatives: (1) comply with the policy, and therefore respond to the situation at hand inappropriately, inadequately, and dangerously; or (2) respond realistically and ignore the policy, thus being made to appear ridiculously hypocritical. The most disturbing aspect of this dilemma is that there is absolutely no excuse for such a choice having to be made: if the foreign policy of a nation is sufficiently flexible to begin with, it will readily adapt to changing situations and remain appropriate at all times. It may, as a consequence, appear ambiguous on paper, but it will function effectively.

The chief reason why this is not possible today is the belief of many conservative government leaders that there is something sacred about a policy, that flexibility implies weakness or appeasement, and that discarding a policy when it ceases to function adequately is equivalent to discarding a principle when expediency dictates such a course of action. This is not at all the case. A policy is essentially a tool, by far more complex than even the most elaborate physical tool but differing in no significant sense from any other tool in terms of the purpose it is intended to serve. The purpose of a policy is to achieve a definite goal; since the entire world is constantly changing, it follows logically that the best means to attain any goal also vary, from year to year and day to day. A policy which is not capable of adjusting to offset these changes is as useless as any other obsolete tool and ought to be discarded (or at least stored away against future need).

The foreign policy of a liberal is essentially opportunistic--which is not to say "unprincipled". I dislike the implication of a moral judgement in using the term "opportunistic", which means little more than "able to seek out and take advantage of opportunities". A flexible policy can accomplish this, but a rigid one cannot because it has been created to deal with a few stock situations and is not at all oriented toward new possibilities. The utility of such an outlook and the concomitant policy would be immediately apparent, if we in this country could rid ourselves of the superstition that policies are somehow hallowed, ranking just below or (in certain cases) equivalent to principles. Senator Fulbright's speech may have been the first sign of such a thawing of American attitudes, a happy eventuality which can only increase our effectiveness as a world power.

IN DEFENSE OF JUSTICE: We are gradually becoming accustomed to living in an era in which certain of the more general predictions of early science fiction are being realized. The accuracy of "prophetic fiction" has been grossly over-estimated by some of the more devoted enthusiasts of the field, but it can hardly be denied that those science fiction writers whose scientific training managed to restrain to a degree their imaginations have compiled an altogether admirable record as prophets. Artificial satellites, dismissed as denizens of the realm of fantasy just a decade ago, are presently so commonplace that a new launching hardly warrants two inches on page six of the morning newspaper; space travel is so casually discussed in the mass media that the first manned craft to land on the surface of the moon will represent an anti-climax; the death ray, that faithful companion of every iron-jawed hero since the 1920's, is present at least potentially as the laser; and

there are many other examples, admittedly less impressive, which could be cited.

Among the most recent instances of science fiction being translated into reality relates to an idea which has actually been surprisingly rare as a fictional theme: viz., the use of computers in courts of law to eliminate bias and human error. The idea, though still in its formative and highly tentative stages, is being seriously considered by many-- and there has recently been a good deal of speculation to the effect that the limited use of highly sophisticated computers in courts of law is not only desirable but entirely practical. No radical innovation is presently contemplated, but it has been suggested that as the body of law becomes more and more complex (as, inevitably, it does with the passage of time), specially designed "thinking machines" may become necessary to assist judges in tracking down ancient decisions and obscure precedents. The potential value of such a system as a convenient method of expediting judicial proceedings is manifest, and it is not difficult to look forward to a time when the very complexity of the law will necessitate such measures. A few generations hence, the computer may be an indispensable fixture in the court, just as, today, a well-stocked law library is an essential tool of the conscientious judge.

If this initial step to improve the system of jurisprudence by minimizing reliance on fallible human memory and judgement is successful, further adaptations of computers to courtroom usage will no doubt be suggested. Eventually, it might be possible to replace judge and jury altogether by highly complex computers, endowed with knowledge of every past decision and precedent and a thorough understanding of the nature of current law, which would be capable of digesting all of the facts in any civil or criminal case and rendering a just and reasonable verdict. Admittedly, this is an idea which, to the twentieth century mind, seems appalling. Human nature being what it is, there would no doubt be a series of furious controversies before the automation of courts achieved this level, and I suspect that investing computers with the power of courtroom arbiters would be resisted to the last breath by very many people. Most of the opposition would be generated by the emotional repugnancy of such a system, however, and not by any rational evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages.

The advantages of trial-by-computer are readily apparent. Such a system would, in one fell swoop, dispose of the histrionics which characterize the more noteworthy criminal trials, and which have the dual effect of turning the courtroom into a circus sideshow and lining the pockets of those lawyers who prefer publicity to dignity. Furthermore, the appeals to irrational biases and prejudices which often influence a jury would no longer be effective tools of unscrupulous attorneys. The equality of all men before the bar of justice would be achieved immediately and insured forever after, for no computer would think a man more or less guilty as a result of his race, religion, national origin, or financial status. No jury could be influenced by the attractive legs of a female witness or the slovenly posture of the defendant. Lawyers would no longer be able to confuse a jury with complicated diagrams or sentences bloated with meaningless legal jargon. And, incidentally, it would no longer be possible to secure a favorable verdict or "hung jury" by bribery, since the computer would hardly be tempted by a roll of bills or a new automobile. (The possibility of tampering with the verdict would still exist, of course: extreme care would have to be taken to prevent the defendant from gaining access to the computer or bribing one of its human technicians.)

Apart from the actually quite paltry matter of constitutionality (the present United States Constitution guarantees trial by jury in criminal cases and would have to be amended if trial-by-computer became fash-

ionable), there is the broader consideration of whether such a system is acceptable within the context of the principles upon which our jurisprudence is founded. The motto of American jurisprudence is "Justice tempered by mercy", and opponents of computer-arbiters would quickly point out that such a system would be incompatible with this principle: machines, no matter how highly sophisticated, simply are not capable of exercising "mercy" in any sense that would be meaningful to a human being. Since the concept of "Justice tempered by mercy" is virtually a sacred tenet of the American Way, this would seem an extremely compelling argument.

I wonder, however, if justice tempered by mercy is necessarily a very wise or workable principle on which to maintain a system of jurisprudence? My thesis is that justice (or a reasonable human approximation thereto) can only be rendered less perfect, less "just", if you will, by adding anything to it. "Justice tempered by mercy" may be an improvement, in some sense, over "Justice tempered by stupidity" or "Justice tempered by greed", but in a very significant sense all these are equally objectionable. Mercy, as such, should have no place in the law, which is by nature impersonal and (supposedly) unmoved by extraneous considerations. If we grant that a specific decision is just, then tempering it by the addition of mercy merely makes a mockery of the law's pretensions to justice.

This is not to say, of course, that the considerations which are generally taken as a justification for mercy should have no modifying effect on the disposal of a case and the imposition of punishment. To achieve justice, all of the factors in a case must be considered--but they must be considered dispassionately. A man who steals to feed his starving children is obviously entitled to greater leniency than a wealthy man whose insatiable greed leads him to crime; a kleptomaniac is obviously entitled to greater leniency than an habitual criminal. But all of these factors should be considered in formulating a just verdict and deciding upon a just punishment; once justice has been achieved, it appears to me utterly foolish to "temper" (i.e., dilute) it by the addition of a wholly emotional quality.

THE NEW BATTLEGROUND: The Negro Revolution of the early 1960's has had an effect upon the entire nation which illuminates and at the same time transcends the victories achieved in specific battles for equal rights. Martin Luther King's valiant struggle in Birmingham, the March on Washington, the omnibus civil rights bill soon to be passed by the Senate, even the callous and brutal murder of four little girls as they attended Sunday School--all are merely contributing factors to the single irrevocable effect of four years of anti-segregation protests. Future historians will record that, after nearly one hundred years of deliberate blindness, white America, in the early years of this decade, was forced to recognize an injustice which is the central fact of life for twenty million citizens of this nation.

It is not, of course, literally true that the majority of white citizens have been completely oblivious to what Gunnar Myrdahl termed the American dilemma. Even those who led what used to be called "sheltered lives" were dimly aware that the Negro, whom they pictured as a perpetually cheerful black fellow who shuffled along the road of life and paused occasionally to entertain his white benefactors with a song-and-dance routine, had certain unique problems. Representatives of his race were occasionally lynched in the Deep South, and white "moderates" both in the North and in the South displayed their disapproval of this method of preserving the Southern heritage by sadly shaking their heads. Elegant and cultured young ladies from Boston, searching for a topic of conversation to enliven monotonous tea parties, gasped "Isn't that just

horrible!" and devoted a few precious moments to the discussion of constructive ways to alleviate what they superciliously referred to as the "Negro problem". There were always, to be fair, a few whites who were sincerely concerned and dedicated their lives to the crusade for freedom and justice for all. But they, no more than the leaders of the Negro community, could fight the organized apathy which their efforts encountered at every turn. White America's greatest claim to fame during the first sixty years of this century may ultimately be found to be its conclusive demonstration of the wisdom of that truism, "None are so blind as those who refuse to see."

In the relatively brief span of four years, all of this has changed. The demonstrations, protest marches, fiery speeches, defiance of local law enforcement agencies--even, to a degree, the violence--is justified to the extent that it has contributed to a great awakening of the public conscience. A new, militant generation of Negroes forcibly focused the attention of the white majority on a situation which they had studiously attempted to ignore for decades. The white man may still fear and hate the Negro, but it is no longer possible to ignore him. The problem (and it is now recognized as what it always was, the white man's problem) is now out in the open, exposed to the harsh light of day; it is no longer possible to deny that a problem exists, or to claim that it exists somewhere else. Recognition of the basic inequity of our social structure permeates every level of American society, every facet of the mass media; it is intertwined with every other social problem, from the failure of American education to urban renewal. Just as an incidental consequence of the awakening of the white majority, the Negro has become ubiquitous in that panoramic mirror of American society, the television tube. When that twenty-one inch bastion of white supremacy falls, and Negroes appear in detergent and razor blade commercials, can justice be far behind?

One of the comfortable delusions which has been shattered by the Negro Revolution is the long-standing myth that race relations was a problem principally in the South. The Southern white has always been less circumspect in proclaiming his bigotry and translating it into legal prohibitions, and it has usually been easier for a Negro to get killed in the South. But these are superficial manifestations of our national shame. There are Negroes today, in Harlem and other Northern urban refuse heaps, who, though their bodily processes and barren lives continue, are just as surely dead as Medgar Evers--dead inside, where it counts. It is not even surprising that Northern segregation and bigotry has inspired the most bitter and militant reaction, for it is surely the most vicious and inhuman segregation. To shoot a man in the back, you must recognize his existence; the very act of passing laws to prevent a Negro from competing with whites in educational institutions is an admission of the Negro's ability to do so. But the distinguishing characteristic of Northern racial prejudice lies in its indifference, and hence its negation of individual human worth. The average white Northerner does not consciously wish to suppress the Negro; he simply refuses to recognize his existence. The potency of this insult cannot be appreciated by any white man. It provides, for those perceptive enough to understand it, the motivation for the recent actions by bands of young Negroes on New York subway trains: if you stab a man, he may hate your guts, but he will at least be forced to admit on something other than a superficial level that you exist.

No one save a few white moderates anxious to stop the boat from rocking believes that the pending civil rights legislation is a panacea. On the other hand, there is general agreement that H.R. 7152 represents a near limit to what can be accomplished in this sphere by legislation, and the passage and scrupulous enforcement of that bill should, within

three or four years, virtually eliminate the present disparity between North and South in the field of race relations. Thereafter, the Northern urban sprawls will constitute the principal battleground on which the struggle for equality will take place. The preliminary skirmishes have already been fought in anticipation of this day, and the weapons, similar but not identical to those utilized with stunning effect in the South, seem strangely out of place in the "enlightened" North. But the battle has hardly begun north of the Mason-Dixon Line, and it promises to be even longer, more difficult, and more hostile than the Southern struggle.

The problems in the North are more pernicious, because the burden imposed on the Negro by the sophisticated white Northerner is more subtle, less exposed to direct attack. The central and critical problem of the Negro in the North is the blatant lack of equality of opportunity in education. The white power structure in the North has no need of heavy-handed measures such as the Southern school segregation laws; precisely the same result is achieved by the creation of Black Ghettos and the occasional gerrymandering of school district lines. And the Northerner is not even compelled to pay lip-service to the doctrine of "separate but equal": the Negro attends schools which are certainly separate, but the white power structure is under no obligation to give them even the outward appearance of being equal.

Most of the other problems confronting Negroes in the North are the direct result of his unequal educational opportunities; many are at the same time a prime cause of this continuing inequality of educational opportunity. A vicious circle is thus established, a self-perpetuating inferno in which millions of American citizens are hopelessly trapped. The educational facilities available to Negroes in the larger Northern cities tend to be sub-standard, because the Negroes are crowded into the older, more dilapidated sections of the city which contain equivalently older, more dilapidated school buildings. These schools are segregated not so much because of a conscious effort by the white community to exclude Negroes from contact with whites but because the neighborhoods in which the schools are situated are segregated. These Northern ghettos exist even where Negroes are guaranteed by law the right to purchase housing anywhere in the city, because the average Negro cannot afford to escape from the ghetto to a more "respectable" neighborhood. The majority of urban-Northern Negroes are unable to acquire well-paying jobs, either because of discriminatory employment practices or lack of sufficient education and training, and so remain among the poorest residents of the city. In the final analysis, their problem is the same as that of whites in the grip of poverty, though of course it is both complicated and aggravated by the racial factor: they are poor because they are untrained, untrained because they are poor.

Note that at no stage is this problem (for it is a single problem, albeit one of many facets) capable of full or immediate solution by legal action. Open occupancy legislation is certainly just and desirable, but such action would be completely meaningless to the vast majority of urban-Northern Negroes, who lack the financial means to move to another neighborhood outside the ghetto. The abolition of racial discrimination in employment is also a necessary step, but--again--one which will assist only a comparatively small minority of urban-Northern Negroes--those who possess the education and training needed to take advantage of the new job opportunities which comprehensive fair employment legislation will open to Negroes. The dilemma of second-rate school facilities is even less a legal problem. Schools in predominantly Negro neighborhoods tend to be older and in poor repair, textbooks are obsolete or do not exist in sufficient quantity, laboratory facilities are insufficient or altogether non-existent, over-crowding is rampant, aver-

age competence of teachers is lower, ad infinitum. This unfortunate situation is the result of a hard fact of political life which manifests itself whenever a community is sharply divided along racial, religious or cultural lines: the group which is politically the most influential receives an inordinate share of the largesse dispensed by the local government. In Northern metropolitan areas, the middle-class whites possess the bulk of political and economic power, and so the school boards are obliged to cater to their whims, diverting the larger portion of their budget to the areas which (ironically) are least in need of the funds.

Protest is far less effective in these cases. A sit-in demonstration at a segregated lunch-counter serves to focus public attention on an injustice which can be swiftly and decisively remedied by legislation, but the injustices which must be engaged and conquered on the new battleground in the North are complex and admit of no simple solutions. The temporary school boycotts which have recently been launched in a number of cities show promise of being highly effective instruments of protest, especially where they are accompanied by specific and detailed demands. But many of the other devices suggested by Northern civil rights activists to highlight and/or remedy specific aspects of Northern racial injustice seem destined merely to generate increased hostility among whites and thus result in a further deterioration of race relations.

Two specific examples of such self-defeating tactics come to mind immediately. The proposals to abolish school district lines and promote "racial balance" in public school systems by transporting children from one neighborhood to another would be an extremely fine solution, if the problem were merely a remnant of an earlier period universally regretted by both races. Unfortunately, sudden integration is still a frightening spectre to many whites, and their agitation is increased by the fact that the transportation of children to other neighborhoods in an effort to further integration may result in their children being sent to inferior schools. The opposition of this considerable group of parents to racial integration is irrational and based on unfortunate misconceptions, but to grant this in no way affects its existence or tempers its ferocity. The second example of a self-defeating tactic I wish to cite here is the abortive World's Fair stall-in, which, while it failed to materialize and was opposed by most responsible civil rights leaders, is nevertheless worth examining. It was, as Joe Pilati pointed out in these pages, an unfocused protest, in the sense that it was intended simply to draw attention to the fact that Negroes in New York have grievances rather than exposing to the glare of public opinion any particular grievance. It was distinguished also by virtue of being a highly-inflammatory tactic: at best, it would have generated great hostility, and could have touched off a violent reaction if, for example, someone had died as a result of emergency equipment becoming stalled in the resultant traffic jam. The amount of animosity which the actual demonstration would have caused is perhaps deducible from the intense opposition encountered by the mere idea of such a protest.

The ultra-militants in the civil rights movement, led at present by Malcolm X, tend to ignore the importance of this white reaction (or "backlash") to certain tactics in the arsenal of civil rights activists. They reason that you lose nothing by further alienating people who already hate you, and thus discount any consideration of the probable reaction in planning protest demonstrations. This disinclination to worry about the consequences of utilizing provocative tactics is based on the fallacy that all white men are so violently opposed to granting civil rights to the Negro that incurring their wrath by irresponsible or violent demonstrations cannot possibly worsen the situation. Having ac-

cepted this fallacy, however, the extremists have been forced to embrace a delusion. If the white community was unreservedly opposed to civil rights for Negroes, then the situation would be hopeless and we may as well prepare for a race-war (a possibility which at least some of Malcolm X's admirers would look upon with delight). Since utter hopelessness is a poor foundation for the sort of messianic movement which Malcolm X hopes to spearhead, he has originated the cruel deception of maintaining that Negroes do not have to persuade the white man, but can organize and take by violence what is rightfully theirs. The followers of this extreme philosophy are convinced that sufficiently militant Negroes can impose their demands on the white community and have them met. I term this a cruel deception because those who propound this theory are too intelligent to believe it themselves but callously endeavor to convince others, less intelligent and more desperate.

The white community is like a rather dim-witted elephant. It can be led, pushed, even prodded into moving forward, but the man who attempts to use violence to force its movement will be trampled. The white community controls most of the political and economic power of the nation; the Negro community, in attempting to achieve equality, can succeed only by using the tools of moral persuasion, because these are the only weapons which the Negro community possesses in sufficient quantity. Civil rights activists can convince, cajole, protest, irritate, make a public nuisance of themselves, scream, editorialize--but they cannot force the white community to grant them equality, because the white community possesses a monopoly on virtually all of the instruments of coercion. The adherents of Malcolm X and other extremist Negro leaders do not sufficiently realize that the method of Martin Luther King is not only the gentlest, most Christian method but, indeed, the only one with a chance of success.

All civil rights protests generate some degree of hostility in some quarters of the white community, and obviously all methods of protest should not be abandoned as a result of this. But there is a certain threshold beyond which it is not wise to go, a point at which the hostility generated by a particular tactic overbalances the advantages of its use. Tactics which exceed that threshold should be abandoned; only a lunatic deliberately enrages an elephant when he is trapped in a cage with it.

The future of the civil rights movement in this country (and, just possibly, the future of the country itself) will depend upon which leaders and which methods are chosen when the struggle begins in earnest on the new battleground. The responsible elements of the civil rights movement plainly have, at present, the prestige and public support, because of the outstanding success of non-violent demonstrations in the South. But the problems of the North are more subtle and general, and they may not be amenable to solution by the normal methods of civil rights protests. Already the leaders in the North have displayed a less scrupulous concern with maintaining non-violence; their failure to achieve their goals immediately may accelerate this breakdown of faith in peaceful protest. Extremists will be lurking in the wings, eagerly anticipating the complete failure of non-violent means, and the new battleground could easily become the bloodiest battleground.

THE ENTIRE STAFF OF KIPPLE wishes to offer its heartfelt congratulations to Bill Osten and Enid Jacobs, who on Sunday, June 28th, were married at the headquarters of the Baltimore Ethical Society. Congratulations are also in order for Bill Murray and the former Susan Abramovitz, although the circumstances surrounding their marriage were considerably less happy.

--Ted Pauls

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"Hallucinogens" are of special interest to me, as they are no doubt to a great many people of introspective nature who see in them perhaps a way to greater self-awareness--or, as John Rackham put it, a way to "transcend" oneself and to achieve "illumination". Rackham did a good job of placing these chemicals in proper perspective--as essentially not different from those naturally produced by the body. There is, therefore, no moral difference between a vision induced by ascetic life and self-flagellation and one induced by LSD. Both are of chemical origin. There is, however, a psychological difference between the two types of vision founded in difference in attitude toward the vision. The psychological experience depends to a high degree on the attitudes and the initial state of mind of the person undergoing it. It is, in fact, determined by whatever the subject is preoccupied with as he goes into the trance. A holy man seeking the word of God shall surely receive it. A rationalist looking for a rationalistic explanation of life and universe will become intensely aware of those aspects of life and universe which fit in with his theories. A person who simply wishes to observe will see with brilliant detail and perception of relationship among things. While a person who undergoes the experience with intention of gaining greater self-awareness will indeed gain insight into his own personality. These things happen to a greater or lesser degree, of course. The variety of psychic experience is as great as the variety among human beings.

What happens when the drug is either released in the body or introduced into the body from outside? As Rackham said, it isn't yet certain. However, whatever the mechanism of the chemical reaction that takes place within the brain, it is certain that the molecules of the drug in themselves do not carry the blueprint of the vision--or, I should say, psychic experience. The drug itself is an innocuous substance, chemically simple, its only peculiarity lying in its similarity to certain indole based chemicals which are naturally manufactured in the body for the purpose of producing emotional states. My theory is that the drug acts as a key which unlocks areas of brain activity not normally used, which exist only as a potential capacity. This is the potential capacity of the human mind which could be attained under ideal conditions but in practice is not even approached. The additional capacity is switched in by the drug, into the network normally available to the consciousness. Because we have never learned to use and control this additional capacity, we are taken on a wild ride while the effect of the drug continues. In so far as we can use some of this additional mental capacity, we can become more perceptive, although our perceptions are usually distorted by the brain's inability to handle the greatly increased influx of perceptions.

The psychic experience induced by a psychoactive drug can be beneficial, I don't think there is any doubt of that, provided the subject is prepared for the experience and capable of coping with it in an intelligent way. On the other hand, it can be very harmful in case of unbalanced, prejudiced, or unprepared minds. As potential psychic poisons these drugs should be treated as all other poisons--with due care--

DISSENTING OPINIONS

and their use should be restricted to those who are not likely to be harmed by the experience. This places the responsibility for administration of these drugs in the hands of qualified psychiatrists only. On the other hand, the psychiatrists should be free to administer these drugs to anyone who in their opinion would benefit from the psychic experience induced. An artist seeking increased aesthetic sensitivity should be able to undergo an LSD-induced experience at any time, provided his mental health is not affected by it. The same applies to anyone who feels he could in some way benefit from the increased perceptivity and increased emotional scope resulting from such an experience. I imagine this will in fact be the case in the not-too-distant future, when the psychiatrists become more familiar with the action of these drugs and public opinion becomes more liberal.

I refuse to condemn or vilify anyone on either side of the Breen case, especially since I don't know the facts except from second-hand reports. I don't know either Walt or Bill Donaho. I have read a letter or two of Walt's, and he appears to be sane and intelligent. As for whatever difficulties with law Walt might have had, I'd like to point out, without taking sides, that law and justice are quite unrelated, except perhaps accidentally. I had personally a friend who was arrested on charge of assaulting a child by kissing him on the mouth. He probably would have been convicted had he not been provided with a better lawyer than the prosecution had. In this case, the fellow had hardly any mischievous intent. He liked children, being rather immature himself, and lacked the judgement required to know where to draw the line. On the other hand, Breen appears to be much more intelligent than this fellow was, and lack of judgement may not apply. It is all quite immaterial to me, in any case.

Before I leave this subject, which I have been trying to ignore, I'd like to make only one remark that might be construed as taking sides--my sympathies, if any, normally tend to go to the underdog, whoever he is in this case. I suspect vaguely that it might be Breen. (The number of individuals who refuse to commit themselves to a definite position continues to amaze me. The most recent declaration of neutrality comes from, of all people, Chuck Wells, who justifies his noninvolvement by acknowledging that there are individuals on both sides of the issue whom he admires. One wonders if this is a particularly relevant observation. The issue in this controversy is whether or not the action taken against Walt Breen was justified, not whether one has friends in both camps. If the Ku Klux Klan revived the grand old tradition of lynchings in Durham, I assume that Chuck's decision as to whether to accept or protest this action would be based on some other ground than the fact that some people whom he admired sympathized with the murder. Precisely the same moral issue arises with respect to the Breen affair; and those who fail to protest are giving aid and comfort to the scoundrels who perpetrated Walter's verbal lynching.)

My opinion regarding the Battle With Communism is that if we can stay out of armed conflict long enough, we may discover that the original cause has become transformed beyond recognition and no longer constitutes a valid cause for armed conflict. However, I am not particu-

larly optimistic about the world's ability to stay out of armed conflict. I have been predicting for many years now that in the next world conflict we shall fight side by side with the Soviet Union against China. The rise of the "yellow menace", however, is hardly the principal issue which will determine the course of future events. We are still in the Renaissance, and the liberal movement is only now approaching its peak impetus. The have-nots are revolting against their lot the world over, and soon there will not be any place in the world where the second class citizens will not be demanding material, cultural, and social equality. How this crisis will be resolved on the world scale remains to be seen, but it is highly improbable that it will be resolved without bloodshed. Even now blood is being shed on Cyprus. This is only the foretaste of things to come. There is a new nationalism on the rise, the nationalism of small underprivileged nations and ethnic groups. While the more advanced, older, and more civilized nations are making some efforts toward reconciliation of differences and ultimate federation for common good, these young and/or underprivileged nations are providing the main disruptive force in world politics. Among the underprivileged nations, China of course is the behemoth that overshadows them all.

"Conscious knowledge, purpose, choice, and values carry as an inevitable corollary responsibility. Capacity for knowledge involves responsibility for finding out the truth and, in our social system, for communicating this. The possibility of choice brings an ethical responsibility for selection of what is right. The sense of values implies means and responsibility for decision as to what is right. Purpose confers the power and, again, the responsibility for translating choice and value into right action. These capacities and responsibilities are not qualities of life in general or of its evolution, but specifically of man. Man is much the most knowing or thinking animal, as our predecessors rightly recognized in bestowing on him the distinctive qualification of sapiens. Man is also the responsible animal. This is more basic than his knowledge, although dependent on it, for some other animals surely know and think in a way not completely inhuman, but no other animal can truly be said to be responsible in anything like the same sense in which man is responsible." --George Gaylord Simpson, in "The Meaning of Evolution".

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Marty Helgesen's attempted defense of Pius XII (in #60) is so weak that I'm surprised you didn't demolish it completely instead of restraining yourself to a single roguish comment. In replying to the criticism of those who accuse the late Pope of having failed to condemn the Nazi Final Solution in order to protect Catholics from harm, Helgesen asserts that his silence "was to protect everyone, including the Jews, from greater harm." It is hard to conceive, as you pointed out, of greater harm befalling the Jews. Of course, seven or eight million could have been murdered, rather than six million, but it was Germany's defeat in the war, not the Pope's silence, which prevented the slaughter from being worse. We know that Hitler's ultimate aim was the utter extermination of the Jews, an aim which we can safely assume would have been realized if Germany had succeeded in conquering the world. So much for the notion that Pius' failure to condemn the Nazi atrocities prevented "greater harm" from befalling the Jews. There were, of course, many Protestants and non-believers within German-dominated territory, but it is difficult to see how they could have been harmed in retaliation.

tion for any action taken by the Vatican. That leaves the Catholics as the only group which could have been harmed as a result of papal intervention, and therefore the only group to benefit from the silence of Pope Pius XII.

A. G. Smith's utterances are comparatively reasonable this time around, and I kind of missed the Smith diatribe which had become the entertainment highlight of each issue of Kipple. Fortunately, George Price and Publicola do a creditable job of pinch-hitting. I vaguely suspect that these are in fact the same man, and further that their originator is actually a liberal with his tongue in his cheek. Publicola seemed serious enough in his original appearance, but the second essay in conservatism (really more a polemic against science and knowledge) is too amusing to be anything other than a deliberate construct. I mean, the apotheosis of ignorance ("innocence" is the euphemism commonly used) is basic to the reactionary's philosophy, but most of them aren't nearly so honest about it. Publicola, instead of hiding the concept behind a few pages of rhetoric, actually states outright that reason is no good and the critical faculty nothing more than "pseudo-scientific scepticism". I must say, though, that his essay is a brilliant parody. I do not recall any previous article outlining in so few words so many conservative attitudes and beliefs: veneration of tradition ("...the private stock of reason which each man possesses is small indeed when compared with the wealth of knowledge inherited from the past..."), conformity ("It is well known by those who understand democracy that a general consensus on basic values must exist..."), religion (Pub's Christianity permeates the whole essay), the utility of misery ("grief and suffering...teaches man to be strong"), dislike of progress, disparagement of man's greatness (except men of nobility--this has usually meant the wealthy scions of proper families), ad nauseum. As for Price, I disbelieve in him simply because of my conviction that perfection is unattainable, even perfection in naivete. There just couldn't be an intelligent person who is able to state, in all sincerity, that inequality of opportunity based on financial status does not exist in this era.

"The problem with censors is, of course, Quis custodiet custodes, who takes care of the caretaker's daughter. Cops and postmen are obviously ruled out. Nor am I happy even with the courts, sensible as their recent rulings have mostly been. If we must have censors, they should be chosen from writers, artists, scholars and other qualified intellectuals who know something about art and literature. The only trouble is few such individuals would want the job. I wouldn't." --Dwight MacDonald, in Yale Political, Autumn, 1963.

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I wish you had handled the Wallace vote in Maryland a little more open-handedly. It seems you presume that the staggering vote accorded a bigot like Wallace speaks for itself, while I'm not at all sure this is the case. Underlining the vote quantity has an advantage that innuendo hasn't: explanation. The 240,000 votes can be explained in large part by the mechanations of the primary itself, where votes are cheaper than they are in the "real" thing, protests have a certain plebian glamor, and any one of a number of issues--integration, states' rights, prayer in public schools--can be justification for a voter's choice.

Wallace, incidentally, now says he'll be on the presidential ballot in twenty to thirty states, but election laws being what they are, this seems patently ridiculous.

A. G. Smith is a prize--sort of an a-religious Goldwater.

I wasn't aware of the American Nazi Party's condemnation of "The Deputy" as a "hate play", but it is hardly surprising. The one time I saw Rockwell speak, he was convincing in his categorization of a number of right-wing groups--less his own, specifically--as "hate groups". He was eloquent in his protestations that his Nazis were not merchants of hate but rather a dedicated group espising the rare air of rationality.

As far as evolution is concerned, I think there is one point that has been missed in discussions centering around other organisms' apparent lackings in this area; simply, there may never be significant changes in the animal world of the future, because man is an ecological force all his own, rendering unnecessary or impossible genetic changes which might have proved adaptive in his absence. (Any ecological force blocks previously existing evolutionary avenues but at the same time creates new ones. The first Ice Age undoubtedly "rendered unnecessary or impossible genetic changes which might have proved adaptive in (its) absence," but simultaneously the climatic shift opened up new channels of evolutionary change. The most obvious examples of man's effect as a potent ecological force concern species of insects in which immunity to pesticides of various types suddenly acquired a high selective value. A slightly more subtle example of new evolutionary opportunity created by man is the adaptive advantage of melanics (black mutants) in industrial areas over the "normal" light-colored moths of certain species. Neither of these examples represents a very broad or significant trend, but it must be remembered that, in geological terms, man has been an important ecological force for only a brief time. Presumably, if our race manages to survive for another million years or so, some of the more common animals (such as rats and mice) will adapt in rather startling fashion to co-existence with us.)

The Whitehead quote in #59 was as interesting as any you've employed since this usually worthwhile custom of opening with a provocative quote began, and it would be received with much jubilation in this corner if only it hadn't been demonstrated in experimental and common-sense terms some time ago. Technically, it's a beautiful example of zero transfer of training. The "sharpening rationale" is pretty rare now; in its place there is something which emphasizes the cross-cultural: being a well-rounded person (geometry) or one familiar with other cultures (Greek, Latin, etc.). This is a logical straw-man, too, but after twenty-odd years of casual observation on how un-wellrounded some people are, and how seriously our contemporary culture is lacking, it isn't a completely unrealistic idea.

Charlie Artman's is a beautiful example of selective anthropology and selected hedonistic thought; I'm not sure that anyone could parody an "I'll-spread-myself-around" attitude any better than has been done here, intentionally or otherwise. It's an uncomfortably strong confirmation of the free-love critic's assertion that unfettered mating is a dysidentifying process; "several women", "choice" and "the rest", indeed!

Grundar dōma, hvergi hann
hallar rjettu mēli;
stundar sōma, aldrei ann
örgu pretta táli.

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Coming home from work this evening all primed to write a couple of pages on the Breen business, with a generally anti-Donaho conclusion, Kipple #60 was waiting and after reading it I'm now in an essentially

anti-Breen and almost pro-Donaho mood, so I might as well take it out on you.

It might be that the loose-knit organization of science fiction fandom has not so much accepted the treatment accorded Walter Breen as it has reconsidered its initial outburst of indignation and condemnation. It knows rather more about the situation now, and is, therefore, less Certain. Harry Warner probably has a point--a good point--in suggesting the avoidance of "endless diatribes"; a lot of talking does little good when no action can be taken. Too much talking, in fact, can do some harm.

Personally, I think John Boston has an excellent idea. He realized that it would be a large-scale job to accumulate enough facts to establish an adequate foundation for a position on either side, and he is wise enough to avoid taking an emotion-based position of the sort so many people (on both sides) are now trying hard to maintain.

I'd like to comment on several of your points:

(1) "...dealing with a fundamental moral issue..." The big headache comes precisely from the fact that we are dealing with a whole bunch of fundamental moral issues, and cannot decide on order of precedence. Does an adult have the right to engage in actions which most people (including most psychologists) consider harmful to the children with whom he practices them? Do other individuals have the right to criticize those actions and to take steps to stop them, even though the child may enjoy them and the child's parent(s) may not object? How far may people go in such matters on the grounds of what they (after serious consideration) believe to be well-founded circumstantial evidence, but which could also be called suspicion? How far are they obligated to do something to prevent what they consider a harmful action, and how far can they shrug it off as "none of my business"? Can they, through inaction, tacitly accept the existence of what they consider an evil? Can one, believing that sexual activity between an adult and a child is harmful to the child, fail to condemn such an action when he believes it has occurred? Can one, with integrity, fail to take steps to prevent the recurrence of such actions? And so forth. (All of these questions represent legitimate moral issues, of course, but most have only a tenuous relevance to the actions of the Committee. Walter Breen has apparently been forbidden to visit the homes of several of his former friends; no one disputes their right to do this, no matter how circumstantial the evidence, and these individuals are certainly within their rights to communicate their suspicions to friends and acquaintances, especially those with young children. Legal action, too, would be perfectly legitimate, but only if initiated by an offended parent (not a vindictive spectator) and accompanied by concrete evidence. It amazes me that apologists for the Pacificon Committee have consistently refused to recognize the extent to which this entire affair is a personal vendetta. Donaho and the Committee are simply using those impeccable moral questions as camouflage. Danny Curran is a good illustration of this. Donaho quoted him in Boondoggle as replying to the assertion that he was illiberal ("square") in this fashion: "Hell, it's not that. You know I have homosexual friends. But I think Walter is a sn-". And this is a handy club to hit him with." Alva Rogers' participation in the lynching should also raise suspicions that the Committee is not particularly concerned with the moral issues; his simpering professions of liberalism and condemnation of the very actions in which he is now engaged were quoted in Kipple #58. There are several admitted homosexuals in science fiction fandom at present, but, so far as I know, none of them has been refused membership in the Pacificon. All of the questions you raised are valid and stimulating, but commenting on them in the context of this specific case would serve no good purpose, for the villains of this lit-

the drama merely use moral questions as convenient levers, applying them in arbitrary and discriminatory fashion.))

(2) "...neutrality is invariably a self-deceptive illusion." Taking a side can also be a self-deceptive illusion, if you don't know all the facts, and it looks very much as if almost no one knows all the facts, or even certain crucial ones, in the case presently under consideration. It is abundantly clear that Breen is extremely interested in children, and it is almost equally clear that part of that interest is of a sexual nature. It is not at all unreasonable to assume that the actions in which he has indulged in public are a pale reflection of those in which he engages in private. (This would be a rather weak point but for some of his written and spoken comments.) (It is perfectly clear from many of my written and spoken comments that I believe homosexuality to be an acceptable and defensible mode of life, albeit one which does not appeal to me personally. It is also true, by some coincidence, that last week I encountered a neighbor's child who had fallen and hurt himself, and in consoling him put my arm around him. Is it therefore reasonable to assume that this action is a "pale reflection" of the actions in which I engage in private?) There are a number of questions which must be answered before one takes a side in this controversy, as I see it, and those answers have either not been forthcoming or cannot be reliably discovered. I have tentatively decided that Walter Breen loves children and would not do anything, intentionally, to harm them. I have also tentatively decided that, with Walter, love and sexual activity are very closely related, and that he believes that sex with a child is good for the child. I disagree with this, for various reasons too complex to go into here, and I believe I have the right (and probably the obligation) to attempt to dissuade him from his opinion or, more precisely, to attempt to prevent him from putting it into practice. (This last clause applies only when force, deception, or a child--as in this case--is involved.)

(3) "...does society or any segment thereof possess the right to exclude from intercourse...an 'undesirable' individual...?" I am a segment of society; do I have the right to refuse to hold intercourse with any individual I wish? The answer to this seems clear to me, and it seems reasonably clear that a social group has the right to exclude any individual they wish, for any reason they wish, or even for no reason at all. I think that an individual or a group is justified in excluding a person if that individual or group considers him dangerous or in any way objectionable. This "objectionable" includes the color of his eyes or skin or the way he parts his hair or the fact that he wears a beard, as well as the fact that he has been known to steal the silverware or rape his host's wife (or daughter, or son) or drop cigar ashes on the new living-room rug, and might be expected to do the same again. I think that many of these reasons are ridiculous ones for excluding a person, but I think that individuals or groups have the right to exclude people for any reason they want. (This point represents a classic conflict between liberalism and conservatism. I regret having asserted, in a moment of recklessness, that no segment of society possessed the right to exclude an "undesirable" individual; obviously, there are circumstances under which such exclusion is justifiable. Still, I contend that such action is unjustified far more often than it is justified. An individual possesses at all times the right to choose his friends and associates on whatever basis he wishes, no matter how ridiculous. But a group or any other entity greater than an individual (e.g., a restaurant) cannot retain this right to the same degree. We are unlikely to achieve anything in discussing this point, however, so I suggest that we agree to quietly disagree. We argued to a stalemate on this point once before, you may recall, when the issue was whether a restaurant owner could le-

gitimately refuse to serve an individual on the basis of his skin color or national origin.})

(4) "...it is...impossible to objectively justify this action..." Who is being, or claiming to be, objective? Human beings, especially in their social relationships, are (almost by definition) nearly entirely subjective.

(5) "A suspected deviate is ostracized and reported to the local police authorities..." Can you think of a better course of action? The ostracism came first, while people were still able to convince themselves that they had no social responsibility and could, in effect, say, "I don't care what he does, as long as he leaves my children alone," and the reporting to the police when they recognized the thinness of this and/or when they realized that, after all, it is the police and the Law which are supposed to take care of such situations.

(6) "...righting an obvious and indefensible injury to a fellow human being..." How about righting the injury suffered by the reputation of the little girl who had the lips of her vagina "tickled" by Walter at a party, or the 10- or 11-year-old boy with whom Walter has (according to two generally reputable people) claimed in letters to have had an extended homosexual relationship, or the two youngsters in New York concerning whom Walter has (we are told) written rhapsodies on the joy of 69ing? Certainly it is possible to say (as Walter does) that it is wrong of Society to impose penalties and a sense of Guilt concerning sex, but society does impose such penalties and--indirectly--a number of psychological problems. It is the obligation of an adult to refrain from enticing into such socially-disapproved actions children or people who are not capable of understanding and rationally accepting the results. It may be the obligation of other adults to enforce the observance of that obligation in other individuals.

This has been, as you may have noticed, largely anti-Breen; this is because it was written in Reaction to your editorial comment. Normally, I don't think of myself as a reactionary, but that has been my response throughout this whole Breen-Donaho business; as I intimated in the first paragraph, every time someone says something--on either side of the matter--I seem to take the opposite position. Since the pro-Breen side has been saying more, and saying it more emotionally, I am drifting gradually over in the Donaho direction (as an average or norm; actually I'm being batted about like a tennis ball, but the Breen side is just a little more repulsive). In fact, however, I disagree quite strongly with the action of the Convention Committee, though I would consider it justified as a Final Resort. I rather think that publishing Boondoggle was an asinine action, but it seems to have been more than compensated for by the asinine statements on the part of the pro-Breen people, many of whom seem either not to know what they are talking about, or to be lying flat-out. (I am pleased to learn that you "disagree quite strongly" with the action of the Committee; in view of your preceding remarks, however, I accept this statement in the same spirit with which I accept Governor Wallace's assertion that some of his best friends are Negroes. Incidentally, and appropos of another remark of yours, if some of Walter's supporters seem a trifle uncertain of all the gory details in the case or of which rumors to believe, perhaps this is due to the curious reluctance of the inquisitors to reply to criticism of their actions and explain obscure points. Copies of each issue of this periodical in which the discussion has been featured have been sent to Donaho and Rogers, with the invitation to reply at any length desired and the guarantee that such a reply would be published. The net effect of this has been nil, and others who have criticized the Pacificon Committee encountered the same unwillingness to reply. Nor have I heard directly from either Walt or Marion (the last letter I received

from Walt was written in early May; in a typical gesture, Walt, in the midst of monumental personal difficulties, took the time to thank me for recent issues of Kipple and apologized for not writing at length). Nevertheless, I believe I possess as much information on this matter as anyone outside of the Bay area, and there are certain facts (such as Donaho's personal animosity and Rogers' hypocrisy) which emerge in such a fashion as to be unmistakeable to even the most superficial examination.→)

I suspect that you're bringing in a ringer in "Publicola"--this "Essay in Conservatism" sounds too much like a parody to be real.

"Experience has quite definitely shown (if only humanity could be persuaded to profit by her!) that some reasons for holding a belief are much more likely to be justified by the event than others. It might be naturally supposed, for instance, that the best of all reasons for belief was a strong conviction of certainty accompanying the belief. Experience, however, shows that this is not so, and that, as a matter of fact, conviction by itself is more likely to mislead than it is to guarantee truth. On the other hand, lack of assurance and persistent hesitation to come to any belief whatever are equally poor guarantees that the few beliefs which are arrived at are sound. Experience also shows that assertion, however long continued, although it is unfortunately with many people an effective enough means of inducing belief, is not in any way a ground for holding it." --Julian Huxley, in "Religion Without Revelation".

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I disagree that Madalyn Murray has reason and justice firmly on her side in her prolonged and seemingly masochistic struggles to remove certain manifestations of religious influence from the schools. Take reason; is it reasonable that the words "under God" find themselves in the pledge to the flag in the first place? I think it is reasonable; this is completely independent of the puzzle as to whether God created man or vice versa. Man may not be reasonable, but it is reasonable that an unreasonable creature like man might want the words "under God" in his salute to the flag. Nor are the words an anachronism; these very words were stuck into the pledge about thirteen years ago and are, of course, the newest additions. Further on reason: few of us are willing to believe that Mrs. Murray's holy crusades are conducted on a solely reasonable, intellectual basis. Her very emotional appeals, her newsletters and letters to the papers are all her own perpetuation of the role which she is so consciously playing as the much-maligned, persecuted, misunderstood, reasonable atheist of Baltimore proper. She is exceedingly aware of her public image and her self-image. To illustrate, we have her writing a letter to the (then) News-Post shortly before Christmas, telling how she was wrapping her presents and trimming her tree. If it is reasonable for a person to need recognition so badly that she/he goes to the ludicrous extremes that Mrs. Murray has gone to, then I suppose Mrs. Murray does have reason on her side. But to the relatively sane person, mere recognition--good, bad, or other--is not an end in itself.

Ted, I am puzzled by parts of your editorial reply to George Price's letter regarding equal opportunity and free enterprise. Stop a minute at equal educational opportunity. I would certainly say that the opportunity is there for those who want it; those who do not certainly have the right to pass it up. Take Price's situation of having worked to put himself through college. This sort of thing is by no means as un-

usual as you seem to think. I am doing precisely the same thing, and I find it no great feat. One does not have to be particularly ambitious to do this; I think I managed to stop working full-time and return to school because I am not particularly ambitious. In high school I was encouraged to take the business course so that I could go out and get a job after graduation. I did precisely this, but the job was a bore so I decided (for want of anything better to do, perhaps) to save a few dollars from the paycheck and then go to college. (Now I've just finished my third year.) But, you say, I could only do this because I am free of family obligations; someone else might get steered into Uncle Angelo's construction business and wind up digging ditches. I know this is true --and that would be his business. At least he would have a choice. You say that "society subjects the entire lower class to a vicious process of elimination." In that case, man would have no free will anyway, neither the rich nor the poor. So it would be futile for any self-appointed idealists to try to generate a synthetic free will that would help some people but not all. Would you say that what you term the "lower class" has less free will than other people?

Regarding unemployment, it is a problem and I would certainly say that snobbery is the reason for a large portion of it. If a man loses his \$100/week job, he probably won't go out and work at one that pays \$85, not even for a little while. If a man gets laid off from his white collar job, he is not going to go out and get a job as a truck driver, even though it might pay more. Rather, he will sit back and wait--months, a year--and in the meanwhile he's getting his unemployment check. As long as the unemployment compensation keeps getting doled out, he has the prerogative of sitting back and waiting. From my personal experience, I find that the people who are constantly out of work have certain personality aspects which make their predicament understandable. Often these individuals are the over-aggressive ones who are determined to take orders from no one. At the other end on the continuum are those extremely passive persons who drift through life letting things happen to them. So perhaps it is the man who is at fault rather than the system itself.

"The historical effect of racial prejudice is strong, regardless of whether it is based on fact or fiction. Mistaken racial views may have played as large a part as either language or nationality in molding human destiny. The attitude of the United States toward Orientals illustrates this. If we had given the Japanese an immigration quota like that of Persia or Rumania, the Japanese would not have felt insulted, and our racial quality would not have been altered by one hundredth of one percent in a decade. The slight racial alteration thus arising would probably have been to our advantage, for the Japanese are an able people. Moreover, the events that led to Pearl Harbor might have been greatly altered." --Ellsworth Huntington, in "Mainsprings of Civilization".

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A few weeks back George Lincoln Rockwell of the American Nazi Party came to speak on the campus of the University of Washington. (A word of background: A while back the University of Washington Political Union had invited Gus Hall to speak and the State Legislature vetoed the invitation, upon which there was a big ruckus and an "open speaker policy" instituted. The Political Union thereupon invited Rockwell as the first speaker under the new policy--apparently with the idea that after that no one would be able to refuse a Gus Hall. Personally, I feel that,

rather than hearing a Nazi or a Communist, I would prefer to hear an African Nationalist or a Black Muslim or a Wobbly or a nudist or an advocate of genuine progressive education (e.g., Paul Goodman) or any of the representatives of dozens of other viewpoints (orgone, ethical vegetarianism, scientology, etc.) which are so little covered in the press that many people don't know what they are or the arguments for them at all.)

Rockwell's talk was limited to University of Washington students and faculty, but I borrowed a faculty card from a friend and managed to get to hear him. The crowd filled Meany Hall and spread down the steps and across the street (as well as those who listened over speakers in another building). There was, in his talk, something for everyone--to join him in 'hating'. He started out about a "Jewish conspiracy" controlling TV and the news media and then went on to "indications of corruption in Western civilization"--homosexuals, modern art (led by that atheistic Jewish Communist, Picasso), modern poetry and novels and music, etc. He then told his program for the Negro ("They're not necessarily worse than whites, but are different and don't fit into White Civilization")--a revival of Marcus Garvey's "Back to Africa" (or, if that proves impossible, putting them on reservations like the Indians--a variation on the Black Muslim program). At this point he started talking about the theory and technique of mass conversion (referring, in particular, to a study of Wesley's success in converting to Methodism) and my opinion of him began to change--a point I'll come back to later. He then called Goldwater a phony front-man put up by the Jewish conspiracy as a dummy opposition to divert any real alternative to the liberal establishment and pointed out that he was going around talking to hostile audiences, getting his message across--unlike the John Birch Society, which just clumped together telling each other how bad Communism and liberals were, thus being completely ineffectual.

After his talk there was a question period and I got to ask him, "Since Jesus was Jewish, do you believe Christianity to have been the first Jewish attempt at world takeover?" Essentially, he said "Yes!" (and actually referred to a Jewish author who asserted Christianity had been manufactured to weaken the Roman Empire). Another question which got a lot of audience reaction was, "Since you claim Jews are so effective in their conspiracies, etc., have you ever considered that perhaps Jews are the superior race?" His answer again was "Yes!" (more fully--he said he considered Jews intellectually superior but unethical, so they eventually turned people against them; and, in any case, the superiority of the Jews made it all the more important for Caucasians to fight to maintain their supremacy). At various times, he expressed sharp disagreement with Hitler and the German Nazis of World War II (though he did insist that the "murder of six million Jews" was a complete lie) and someone eventually asked him why he referred to himself and his program as "Nazi". His reply was quite interesting. He said first that it was because he was a racist, believing that "race" was a fact and an important consideration in the health of a society. Second, he referred back to his earlier remarks concerning the theory of conversion and noted that one can never convert people unemotionally, by reason--if by using such a label as a "shocker" he could get people to listen to him in an emotional rather than critical-rational attitude, then, even if they came hating him, he had a better chance of converting them than if they came neutral.

I used to feel John Boardman was getting all excited about nothing in considering Rockwell anything more than an inconsequential nut. Now I'm not so sure. Certainly, despite the "way out" idiocy of his program, I cannot dismiss him as insane (in any legal or clinical sense), and he displays a competence as a speaker and an apparent understanding

of the phenomenon of mass conversion, etc., which makes me hesitate to ignore him as inconsequential. Despite his claims, there seems no chance at all of his attracting much following so long as the United States remains more-or-less prosperous--in good times no one wants to rock the boat. Given another depression (and, especially after talking to various economist friends, this seems a non-negligible possibility over the next decade or so) I would expect (as happened in the U.S.--and in Germany--thirty-odd years ago) a tremendous rush to the extremes and polarization of opinion into radical Left and radical Right, with only a most ineffectual middle. Under such circumstances, it could be a toss-up as to whether or not Rockwell might take power. Hitler, remember, was elected legitimately into office and I think it could also happen here--Americans are not all that different. (Cf., in that context, the report on the Yale study on obedience in the last Anthrohedron or the occasions noted in the New York Times of people watching a rape or murder without either helping the victim or calling the police.) (Even granting the proposition that people tend to rush to the extremes during economic depressions, I tend to think that you are unnecessarily concerned about Rockwell. Remember that, although extremism flourished during the Great Depression, the great majority of Americans rejected both extremes and supported a government slightly left-of-center. A similar depression today would doubtless dramatically swell the ranks of Rockwell's followers, but under no circumstances it is probable that his party could gain the support of more than a negligible minority. It is misleading to compare the United States with Germany; Germany had no tradition of democratic government, and the majority of its citizen were not only resentful of the incumbent government under the Weimar Republic but were, furthermore, distrustful of their basic system of government.)

You quote from Twain on science--"One gets such wholesale returns of conjecture out of such a trifling investment of fact." This quote seems highly relevant to the "Pacificon scandal". Since the "facts" are as uncertain to me as they must be to you (or, indeed, to any one of those vociferously commenting with the possible exception of the principals) I can only proceed with some more conjecture. Let me start by saying that my present comments are specifically addressed to the question of boycotting the convention and, more generally, to the actions and responsibilities of the committee; the questions of Walt's actual guilt or innocence or sexual attitudes and proclivities or possible future actions are not under discussion--I will simply make the working assumption that the committee felt convinced that (a) Walter had, in the past, "molested" young children (e.g., Poopsie), (b) he was having an affair, including explicitly sexual activity, with Glen, (c) there was a good chance of his approaching other children (in particular, Alva Rogers was concerned for his own kid(s)). Whether or not the committee members were correct in their beliefs, I am willing to believe that they had sufficient evidence (?) to convince them. (Indeed, this is undeniable, but is it really important? George Lincoln Rockwell undoubtedly has enough "evidence" to convince him that there is a Jewish conspiracy, Lee Harvey Oswald (if the actual assassin) unquestionably possessed sufficient "evidence" to demonstrate to his own satisfaction that President Kennedy deserved to die, Robert Welch is surely convinced that Dwight Eisenhower was a conscious agent of the Communist conspiracy, ad nauseum.)

At that point, and especially because it was a divisive issue in the Bay area, I consider it quite reasonable of them to consider the possible effect on the convention of any situation which might arise. Especially (squared) after speaking to a lawyer and being told of possible liability for damages, they could only have felt that Something

Must Be Done. (Parenthetically--I really can't follow the legal position but must, not being a lawyer, accept the possibility that the situation under California law is as the committee states the lawyer told them.)

It is at this point that I feel the committee could have done better. Sending out copies of Boondoggle (and I found its flippant tone extremely offensive, judging by the excerpts I've seen) was a goof. Not having a private discussion with Walter was a mistake (not on the basis of "Don't come or we'll ban you"; rather, "Such and such is the problem as we see it--what would you suggest?"). Organizing a convention is a lot of work and, on many counts, a difficult job. This question didn't make it easier and it is not really surprising that it was handled badly. It is even more unfortunate that no one can seem to find a way out and positions become more and more hardened and polarized as time goes on. While one might have hoped that some other action had been taken (and certainly the name-calling is deplorable--I say nothing of any slurs on Marion as I have not myself heard anything of them but assertions that such have been made) it seems well within the powers which a convention committee must have to take the official action which was, in fact, taken. The situation seems one in which the committee, to have any chance of succeeding at all, must have plenary powers to deal with situations as they arise without the constant threat or appeal to or repeal by an overseeing fandom. One's guard against abuse of these powers is not to be found in organizational constraints on committee actions or in hostile pressure or reprisal after the fact but rather in the selection of a committee which, on the whole, people can trust to behave reasonably. It is true that, formally, legally, there may be a chance of a future convention committee using this as a precedent for banning someone on the grounds of fornication--but I'm sure you don't believe that is likely to happen. No doubt in the future the balloting will involve consideration not only of the relative advantages of whatever city is nominated but of the probity of the respective committees.

That point made, I feel a boycott of the convention is unlikely to serve any useful purpose. The Pacificon Committee is clearly unmoved by the threat (at any rate, whatever "motion" is not directed toward resolving the issue or retroactively declaring Walter persona grata, but toward a hardening resolve and resentment) and the actual occurrence of a boycott (even if far more successful than might reasonably be expected) would come too late to change anyone's mind. I noticed an advertisement supporting the committee's action in the latest Pacificon report and I would be willing to subscribe toward a similar advertisement protesting the handling of the affair and hoping that this not be taken as a precedent. I also intend to be present at the business meeting and perhaps some understanding in this area can be written into the ground-rules for future conventions. That sort of action seems far more promising to me than a boycott and I fully intend to go to the convention--I also hope to attend a couple of the "outside" parties at which Walter will be present, as I consider him generally intelligent and interesting and enjoy his company and conversation. I have protested against an attempt to drop him from the Cult /an amateur press association of sorts/ and, while recognizing the committee's power to exclude him from the convention (and their responsibility to act in some way on this issue), definitely oppose any thought of "severing" Walter from science fiction fandom.

On looking over a lot of the recent issues I feel that I have the sympathies of a "typical liberal" on most issues, but the view of the "nature of Man" one might expect of a conservative. Or to put it another way--people are no damn good. And they can hardly be expected to do a better job of governing themselves than they are doing.

I agree with the integrationists that segregation is Evil and so on, but--I agree with the segregationists that the average Negro is not ready for "self-government". On the other hand, most Southern whites aren't ready for self-government--and, for that matter, neither are most Northerners.

Maybe I'm just discouraged tonight.

"The problem of social value is intimately involved in the fact of the different patternings of culture. Discussions of social value have usually been content to characterize certain human traits as desirable and to indicate a social goal that would involve these virtues. Certainly, it is said, exploitation of others in personal relations and overweening claims of the ego are bad whereas absorption in group activities is good; a temper is good that seeks satisfaction neither in sadism nor in masochism and is willing to live and let live. A social order, however, which like Zuni standardizes this 'good' is far from Utopian. It manifests likewise the defects of its virtues. It has no place, for instance, for dispositions we are accustomed to value highly, such as force of will or personal initiative or the disposition to take up arms against a sea of troubles. It is incorrigibly mild. The group activity that fills existence in Zuni is out of touch with human life--with birth, love, death, success, failure, and prestige. A ritual pageant serves their purpose and minimizes more human interests. The freedom from any forms of social exploitation or of social sadism appears on the other side of the coin as endless ceremonialism not designed to serve major ends of human existence. It is the old inescapable fact that every upper has its lower, every right side its left." --Ruth Benedict, in "Patterns of Culture".

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You may be gratified to know that the mail to congressmen about the prayer amendment proposals has been running sharply against the idea in recent weeks. Apparently, second thoughts have strongly influenced many clergymen to back away from supporting any amendment in spite of their disagreement with the Supreme Court's decision. (My authority for this is Time magazine.)

Proposals to override the reapportionment decisions have never met with the same favor, and with so many Senators from states with large cities in them any overriding amendment would probably never get by the Senate anyway.

Jean Rose (in #60) makes a good point when she says, "...such phrases as 'Causeless Cause' and many other paradoxical expressions arise because we have all these damn words, and insist on playing with them..." But she seems to fall into that very trap in the next sentence when she says, "The 'reason' that we are here and are as we are is just exactly that we are here, and that had we been grossly different, we probably wouldn't be." There is no need to assign any "reason" for our being here. "Reason" is a hopelessly muddled word anyway; one cluster point for its many meanings is that of the conscious intention of the person who performed the act, and there is no evidence that any person performed the act of putting us here. Another cluster point occurs in the desire to pinpoint some prior occurrence, to single it out, with the claim that if that had not happened, then this would not have. This of course opens the Pandora's Box of the Problem of the Contrapositive. And the prior occurrence so pinpointed is often called the Cause; which opens up another Pandora's Box. In any case, if this is her idea, then she is just stating a tautology, for of course if we were grossly dif-

ferent (presumably so different that the pronoun "we" would no longer apply) then "we" would not "be here".

The reason many people, myself included, choose to remain neutral concerning the Pacificon Committee's actions on Walter Breen is that we do not have all the facts in hand and have no easy way to get them. It is one thing to think of the various individuals in science fiction fandom as knowing each other well through their letters and publications, but when one is confronted with (1) a man's reputation and (2) the safety of children one does not lightly take the word of a person one has met rarely if at all, in spite of the number of letters one has received from him. I do not have any reason to doubt the word of any of the persons making the various charges and counter-charges, you understand; it's simply such an important matter that I do not know them well enough to take their word. There are valid reasons for excluding someone from a convention, and if absolutely all the charges which have been made against Walter are true, there is just barely a possible case for excluding him.

However, I can criticize the committee for the way it handled the affair; in fact, they handled it so badly that I, for one, will not support the Pacificon Committee in any way. Furthermore, the attempt to exclude him from the Fantasy Amateur Press Association, which has just been overridden by a petition signed by (at last count) 39 of the 65 members, is, in my mind, invalid on the grounds of irrelevancy. Even if the charges were relevant, there is no danger to anyone in his membership, so I must reject them as unproven. For although I am willing to act on quite incomplete evidence if the safety of those who are not able to take care of themselves is involved, I must demand quite complete proof before I will participate in destroying a man's reputation for lesser reasons. Besides, in this case, as I implied above, there aren't even any lesser reasons.

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